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Surrogate Testimony After Williams:
A New Answer to the Question of Who May Testify
Regarding the Contents of a Laboratory Report
JENNIFER ALBERTS*
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 However, for the past few years,
the Supreme Court has struggled to determine just how this right applies to reports
produced by forensic laboratories.2 On the one hand, forensic laboratories make
mistakes.3 Sometimes, they even engage in fraudulent science.4 It seems clear that
defendants should have some means of assessing the credibility of these laboratories’
reports, and the method that the Constitution prescribes is cross-examination.5
On the other hand, however, scientific reports are quite different from
statements made by lay witnesses. There are already a number of procedures in
place to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence.6 Is cross-examination still
necessary? More importantly, a report produced by a laboratory is usually created
by a number of laboratory workers.7 This presents a crucial question: Which
individual must testify in order for a report to be introduced as evidence in a trial?8
In the Court’s most recent decision on the issue, Williams v. Illinois, the Court
provided no clear answer to this important question.9 The Court held that the
witness in that case could testify to a conclusion based on a report received from a
different laboratory, and make some references to that report in the process, without
any person from the other laboratory testifying.10 But there was no single majority
rationale in the case.11 Nonetheless, the plurality seemed to consider a number of
factors in reaching its decision.12
This Note draws on some of the factors that the plurality seemed to focus on in
Williams (although the plurality did not explicitly consider these factors as a part of
any test) to propose a new answer to the question of who must testify. Specifically,
this Note proposes that a witness who did not observe or participate in the testing
process should nonetheless be allowed to testify regarding the contents of a

* J.D. candidate, 2015, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
3. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319–21.
4. See id. at 318–19.
5. Id. at 318.
6. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726–27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
7. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8. See id.
9. See 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion).
10. See id. at 2227–28.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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scientific report if three conditions are met: (1) the underlying analysis is shown to
be reliable, (2) the report that is relied upon is sufficiently detailed, and (3) the
testifying witness is an adequate substitute witness.
Part I of this Note examines how the Court has interpreted the Confrontation
Clause since Ohio v. Roberts. It begins by reviewing how the Court has applied the
clause to lay witnesses and then discusses how the Court has attempted to apply
those same principles to scientific evidence, as well as the problems the Court has
run into in doing so. Part II presents an overview of the problem of applying the
Confrontation Clause to scientific reports. It examines reasons why scientific
evidence needs to be confronted in court, reasons why it cannot be treated the same
way as statements made by lay witnesses, and solutions to the problem that have
already been proposed. Finally, Part III presents a novel answer to the question of
who may testify to the contents of a laboratory report. Part III suggests that the
three-part test mentioned above would be the best solution to this problem.
I. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASE LAW: FROM ROBERTS TO CRAWFORD TO WILLIAMS
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”13 However, there is much
confusion regarding precisely who must be confronted in order for the person’s
statement to be used in court. For twenty-four years, the admissibility of out-ofcourt testimony by witnesses against the accused was determined solely by the
reliability of the testimony. The Court held in Ohio v. Roberts that evidence that
fell within an established hearsay exception or that bore other “indicia of
reliability” or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible
without any opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant.14
The standard for the admissibility of out-of-court statements changed, however,
in 2004, when the Court decided Crawford v. Washington.15 In that case, the Court
overruled Ohio v. Roberts and began a new era of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.16 Crawford was charged with the assault and attempted murder of a
man, Lee, who he believed attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia.17 He claimed to have
acted in self-defense.18 Crawford testified that he thought he saw Lee reaching for
something before he stabbed Lee.19 His wife, on the other hand, who was also a
suspect at the time,20 in a somewhat ambiguous tape-recorded statement to the
police,21 seemed to say that Lee may have reached for something after Crawford

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 38, 40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 38–40.
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assaulted him and that Lee had nothing in his hands after he was stabbed.22 This
statement was played for the jury during trial, and Crawford was convicted.23
The lower courts’ conclusions with respect to the reliability of the tape-recorded
statement varied. The trial court in Crawford found that the statement was reliable
and admissible because the statement mostly corroborated Crawford’s own
statement: Sylvia had direct knowledge of what happened, Sylvia was describing
recent events, and Sylvia was being questioned by a “neutral” officer.24 The court
of appeals reversed, finding the statement unreliable because it contradicted a
previous statement, it was made in response to specific questions, and Sylvia had
closed her eyes during part of the altercation.25 The Washington Supreme Court
reversed again, finding that the statement was reliable because it was “virtually
identical” to Crawford’s statement.26
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court and
found that admission of the tape-recorded statement violated Crawford’s right to
confront witnesses.27 Finding that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely
subjective, concept,”28 the Court held that reliability is no longer relevant to the
admissibility of an out-of-court statement under the Confrontation Clause.29
Instead, all testimonial statements are only admissible if the declarant testifies in
court or the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him or her.30
For five years, this standard was applied to only lay witnesses.31 It was
developed with respect to lay witnesses in two major decisions: Davis v.
Washington32 and Michigan v. Bryant.33
In Davis v. Washington, the Court found that the admission of a 911 call by the
victim regarding the defendant was constitutional without the victim’s testimony in
court.34 In the call, the victim named the defendant and said that he was attacking
her.35 In the companion case to Davis, Hammon v. Indiana, on the other hand, the
Court found that the victim’s statements to the police while she was standing in a
different room than the defendant, after an incident of domestic violence had
occurred, were not admissible without confrontation.36 The Court adopted the
“primary purpose” test to resolve these cases. Under this test, statements made

22. Id. at 39–40.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 41.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 68–69.
28. Id. at 63.
29. Id. at 68–69.
30. Id. at 68.
31. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307, 310 (2009) (holding that
affidavits created by forensic experts were subject to the Confrontation Clause’s limitations).
32. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
33. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
34. 547 U.S. at 817–19, 829.
35. Id. at 817–18.
36. Id. at 819–20, 834.
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during a police interrogation which, examined objectively, are made for the
primary purpose of assisting the police in resolving an ongoing emergency are not
testimonial and, therefore, not subject to Confrontation Clause limitations.37 But
statements made during a police interrogation are testimonial when, examined
objectively, they are made for the primary purpose of establishing or proving past
events potentially relevant to a later prosecution.38 Several factors that were
important to the Court were whether the statements were elicited during
interrogations,39 whether the statements described past events or events as they
were occurring,40 and the level of formality of the statements.41
In Michigan v. Bryant, the Court expounded on this “primary purpose” test
further.42 In Bryant, the police found the victim mortally wounded in a gas station
parking lot.43 The Court held that the victim’s statements to the police describing
what had happened were not testimonial because they had the primary purpose of
assisting the police in resolving an ongoing emergency.44 Thus, they were not
subject to Confrontation Clause limitations.45 In so holding, the Court considered
several factors: whether the threat was to the public or merely to the victim,46 the
type of weapon used,47 the medical condition of the declarant,48 and the formality
of the interrogation.49
Significantly, in Bryant the Court brought reliability back into the picture as a
part of its Confrontation Clause analysis. The Court found that because there is a
significantly diminished “prospect of fabrication” in situations where participants
in an interrogation are focused on resolving an emergency rather than on proving
facts related to past events, confrontation is unnecessary.50 The Court compared
this to the justification for the excited utterance hearsay exception.51 That is, a
declarant who is in an excited state because of an event presumably cannot easily
form a falsehood when describing that event.52 The Court found that hearsay
exceptions such as this one may be relevant in determining whether a statement is
testimonial.53 This was significant because it was a departure from Crawford,
where the Court found that reliability and hearsay exceptions were no longer a part
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.54

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 822.
Id.
See id. at 826.
See id. at 827.
See id.
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1155.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
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After Davis, but two years before Bryant, the Court first applied the
Confrontation Clause to evidence provided by forensic scientists.55 In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court held that affidavits sworn to by forensic
scientists that indicated both the weight of a white powder and that the powder was
found to be cocaine were testimonial and inadmissible without the in-court
testimony of the forensic scientists who performed the analysis of the substance.56
According to the Court, affidavits such as the ones in Melendez-Diaz clearly fall
within the category of testimonial statements that are subject to the confrontation
requirement.57 They were clearly “made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial” because use at trial was the sole purpose of the affidavits.58
Nonetheless, as a 5–4 decision, this was the first highly divided decision issued by
the Court since the Crawford era began.59 Massachusetts and the dissent made several
arguments as to why the Confrontation Clause should not apply to this type of case,
all of which were rejected by the majority60: (1) the affidavits were only accusatory
when taken together with other evidence;61 (2) the scientists who made the statements
were not conventional witnesses because they were recording contemporaneous
observations rather than recalling past events, did not actually observe the crime, and
did not make their statements in response to an interrogation;62 (3) the statements
were the result of neutral, scientific testing;63 (4) the statements were similar to
business records;64 (5) the defendant could subpoena the analysts;65 and
(6) practicality demands that the analysts not be required to testify.66 The majority
found these arguments to be flawed and explained in detail how scientific evidence is
not as reliable as Massachusetts suggested.67
The dissent, in particular, stressed the practical difficulties that would result
from this decision. The majority wrote that the “analyst” has to testify in court in
order to admit the results of the lab analysis, but who is the “analyst”?68 According
to the dissent, a number of scientists play a role in every test for drugs, it is
impractical to have them all testify, and it is impossible to determine from the

55. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (holding that affidavits
created by forensic experts were subject to the Confrontation Clause’s limitations).
56. Id. at 307–08, 310.
57. Id. at 310.
58. Id. at 311 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
59. Crawford was a 9–0 decision with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor
concurring only in the judgment but dissenting in the reasoning. Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 37 (2004). Davis was an 8–1 decision with Justice Thomas concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 815 (2006). Melendez-Diaz was a
5-4 decision. 557 U.S. at 306.
60. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313–25.
61. Id. at 313.
62. Id. at 315–16.
63. Id. at 317.
64. Id. at 321.
65. Id. at 324.
66. Id. at 325.
67. Id. at 317–21.
68. Id. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion which one has to testify.69 The question of who must testify
remained unanswered.70
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, stating that only formalized
statements are subject to Confrontation Clause limitations.71 The affidavits in this
case, however, were sufficiently formal to qualify.72
After Melendez-Diaz, the Court addressed the issue of how the Confrontation
Clause applies to forensic experts once more in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.73 In
Bullcoming, the Court answered the question of whether a surrogate (or substitute)
expert could be used to testify to the results of another expert’s analysis.74 The
State had introduced into evidence a forensic laboratory report that contained the
results of a blood-alcohol analysis; however, instead of having the analyst who
performed the test testify, the State called to the stand a different analyst from the
laboratory who was familiar with the testing procedures but had not observed that
particular test.75 The analyst who had performed the test was not called to testify
because he had been placed on unpaid leave for unknown reasons.76
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that this substitute witness testimony
was permissible because the analyst who performed the test was merely recording
the results provided by a machine; the analyst who testified could testify regarding,
and be cross-examined about, the operation of the machine, what the results meant,
and the laboratory procedures.77 The United States Supreme Court, however,
reversed and held that this was a violation of the defendant’s right to confrontation;
according to the Court, the analyst who certified the report must testify.78 A
different analyst would not be able to testify, for example, that the test-performing
analyst received the sample intact or that he performed the test according to
protocol.79 A different analyst also could not testify regarding the competence or
honesty of the other analyst.80
Justice Sotomayor, however, described in her concurrence four situations in
which the results of a test may be able to be introduced without the testimony of the
test-performing analyst: (1) when the primary purpose of the report is not to be
used as evidence in a trial;81 (2) when the person who does testify regarding the
results of the test is a supervisor or reviewer who had some minimal connection to
the test;82 (3) when an uninvolved expert presents an independent opinion regarding

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 332–33.
See id. at 325–28 (majority opinion).
Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 330.
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Id. at 2710.
Id. at 2709.
Id. at 2711–12.
Id. at 2713.
Id. at 2710.
Id. at 2714.
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
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a report that is not introduced into evidence;83 and (4) when the State presents only
machine-generated results, such as a printout from the machine.84
Bullcoming was another 5–4 decision.85 The dissent again argued that the
majority provided no explanation as to why one participant in the testing process
must testify and others need not and offered no guidance for determining who must
testify in future cases.86 According to the dissent, the analyst involved in the test
did no more than any other participant in the testing process.87 In addition, the
dissent argued that reliable scientific evidence is not what the Confrontation Clause
was designed to exclude from trial.88 Scientific evidence, such as the report in this
case, can have checks on its reliability besides cross-examination that make
cross-examination less necessary: the opportunity for retesting, result-blind issuance
of reports, the independence of the lab, routine procedures, and mass testing.89 These
characteristics of science, according to the dissent, are reason to treat scientific
evidence differently than lay witness statements with respect to confrontation.90
Finally, in Williams v. Illinois, the Court issued its most recent opinion
regarding forensic experts and the Confrontation Clause.91 Williams was unique
because the dissenting justices from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming finally became
the plurality and, thus, limitations were placed upon those two cases.92
In Williams, a forensic expert testified that a DNA profile created by the
Cellmark lab from semen found on vaginal swabs from the victim matched a DNA
profile created by the state crime lab from a sample of the defendant’s blood.93 The
expert testified that the DNA sample that she matched had been received from the
Cellmark lab, and documents were introduced that stated that vaginal swabs from
the victim had been sent to and received back from the Cellmark lab.94 No one from
the Cellmark lab testified regarding the DNA sample that it produced.95
The Court found no Confrontation Clause violation.96 The plurality provided
two alternative reasons for this conclusion. First, it found that the testimony
regarding the DNA profile produced by the Cellmark lab was permissible because
any reference to the profile was being offered not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but merely to explain the basis for the expert’s conclusion that she found a
DNA match.97 Second, it found that any statements made by the Cellmark lab that

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2709.
Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2724.
Id. at 2726.
Id. at 2727.
Id. at 2726–27.
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
See id. at 2227–28 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2227.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2228.
Id.
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were introduced were not testimonial because they were not made with the “primary
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct.”98
Although those two rationales were the rationales that the plurality explicitly
adhered to in its opinion, the plurality, like the Court in Bryant, also seemed to
consider reliability as a part of its analysis. According to the plurality, “reliability is
a salient characteristic of a statement that falls outside the reach of the
Confrontation Clause.”99 Because the police did not even have a suspect at the time
that the Cellmark lab produced a DNA profile from the semen found in the victim,
the plurality noted that there was no prospect of fabrication of the DNA profile.100
Furthermore, without having a sample from the defendant at the lab, there was no
real chance that the lab would produce a profile matching the defendant by
mistake.101 Finally, any mistake that may have been made could likely be detected
by looking at the profile itself, which the expert who testified did.102 For these
reasons, these statements were not the type of statements the Confrontation Clause
was designed to protect against.
Justice Breyer concurred. He suggested that reports prepared by accredited labs,
or at least accredited DNA labs, should presumptively fall outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause because there are already procedures in place to promote
their reliability.103
Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, finding that the report in this
case was not testimonial because it was informal.104
After Williams, it remains unclear precisely how expert reports are to be handled
with respect to the Confrontation Clause. The lower courts are divided,105 and the
Supreme Court has done nothing to provide direction. Bryant and Williams
demonstrate a trend towards incorporating reliability back into the analysis.106
However, the Court has not explicitly abandoned Crawford or declared reliability
to be a part of any test.107
As Justice Breyer noted, the question of which expert must testify in order to
introduce any given report, when a number of experts are involved in the testing
process, has yet to be answered.108

98. Id. at 2242.
99. Id. at 2243 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 2243–44.
101. Id. at 2244.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2248–52 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. Different courts have taken different approaches. For example, some courts have
followed Justice Thomas’s concurrence, requiring formality for a statement to be
testimonial. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 73 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Md. 2013). Others have
followed one of the two plurality approaches. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reavis, 992
N.E.2d 304, 310–12 (Mass. 2013) (allowing an expert to testify regarding an opinion that
was based on statements made by another expert who did not testify). Finally, some courts
have rejected all of the Williams approaches. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79,
95–96 (2d Cir. 2013).
106. See supra notes 50–54, 99–102 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 42–49, 97–98 and accompanying text.
108. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246–48 (Breyer, J., concurring).

2015]

SURROGATE TESTIMONY AFTER WILLIAMS

449

II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF EXPERT REPORTS
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Before addressing the question of who must testify, raised by the dissenting
justices in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and by Justice Breyer in Williams, we
must examine the arguments for and against subjecting forensic experts to the
confrontation requirement. This Part first considers the primary reasons why
experts must be subject to confrontation. Second, this Part examines the reasons
why statements made by experts may need to be treated differently than statements
made by lay witnesses with respect to the Confrontation Clause. Finally, this Part
reviews the solutions to this problem that have thus far been suggested.
A. Why Experts Must Be Confronted
There are two main reasons, both discussed by the Court in Melendez-Diaz, why
forensic expert witnesses should be subject to the confrontation requirement. The
first reason is formal. Under Crawford, confrontation is a procedural requirement
that must always be observed.109 Forensic expert witnesses are not exempt from
this requirement, and defendants have a right to confront those experts in court
when the experts provide testimony against the defendants.110
The second reason is more functional. Confrontation is a mechanism designed to
ensure the reliability of evidence,111 and the Court in Melendez-Diaz expressed a
number of concerns about the reliability of forensic evidence.112 If courts were to
limit the confrontation requirement with respect to forensic experts, then they
would have to address these concerns in some way. The problems the Court found
with the accuracy of forensic science can be roughly divided into four types of
errors: (1) errors in the interpretation of results, (2) errors in the methodology, (3)
mistakes made during the testing process, and (4) fraud. This Note will briefly
explore each type of error.
One type of error that forensic scientists sometimes make is in interpreting the
results of their analysis. This kind of error might occur in a report but often occurs
during the scientist’s testimony at trial.113 Professor Brandon Garrett and Innocence
Project Co-Director Peter Neufeld conducted a study to examine the validity of the
testimony that forensic scientists gave in court regarding the interpretation of their
results in a number of cases.114 They found that, in 82 out of 137 cases (60%),
forensic scientists had formed and testified to conclusions that were invalid based
on the data they had generated through their scientific testing.115 That is, even if the

109. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
110. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309–11 (2009).
111. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence . . . .”).
112. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317–21.
113. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (examining the validity of forensic
science testimony).
114. Id. at 7–8.
115. Id. at 9.
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data they generated were accurate, their interpretation of their own results was
inaccurate. The errors that the scientists made dealt with probabilities—in all of the
cases, they essentially testified that the probability that the perpetrator was the
defendant, based on the results of their testing, was greater than it actually was.116
An example of this type of error occurred in the case of Gary Dotson, an
innocent man who was convicted of rape but later exonerated based on DNA
evidence.117 At Dotson’s trial, a forensic scientist who had analyzed a sample from
a vaginal swab from the victim testified that the donor of the semen in the victim
had type B blood, that Dotson also had type B blood, and that only 11% of the
population has type B blood.118 This suggested that 89% of the population could
not have been the donor and that Dotson was in the 11% of the population that
could have been the donor. However, in the Dotson case, the victim also had type B
blood.119 The sample that came from her could have been type B because of her
own fluids in it, rather than the semen.120 Thus, 100% of the population could have
been the donor because there was no information about the blood type of the semen
donor that could be obtained from the sample.121 The scientist’s testimony about
the results of the testing was misleading.
A second type of error arises from the use of an invalid forensic methodology.
Over time, scientists have discovered that a number of methodologies that were
once considered reliable are not reliable enough.122 For example, during the 1970s
and 1980s, scientists used the color test and the crystal test to identify drugs.123
After those methods were found to be unreliable, scientists began to use thin-layer
and gas-liquid chromatography for that same purpose.124 That method, too,
however, was determined to be unreliable after time.125 In 2009, the National
Academy of Sciences released a report that reviewed all of the methods commonly
used in forensic science and attempted to assess their validity.126 It found that the
methods used to analyze some types of evidence, such as impression evidence
(shoe tracks, tire tracks, etc.), tool marks, and firearms, have not been validated and
may not be reliable.127
Even when a method is reliable, however, there are errors that can be made
during the testing process that can make the results inaccurate. Thus, the third type
of error that forensic scientists make is mistakes in the testing process. An example

116. See id.
117. Id. at 4; see also Affidavit of Edward T. Blake, D. Crim., People v. Dotson, No. P.C.
4333 (July 29, 1985).
118. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 113, at 4.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 493–94
(2006).
123. Id. at 493.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127–82 (2009).
127. Id. at 149, 154.
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of this was provided by the dissent and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Williams.
These opinions described the Kocak case,128 where an analyst testified, based on a
report, that her laboratory had found DNA from the crime scene to match the
defendant’s DNA.129 After reviewing the laboratory’s notes, however, the analyst
realized that there had been a mistake in the report.130 The DNA from the crime
scene matched the victim’s DNA, not the defendant’s.131 Someone who was
involved in the writing of the report must have misread the label on one of the
samples.132 That is, the laboratory made a mistake.
Even a competent scientist may make some mistakes; however, there is also the
problem of analyst incompetence. Many workers at laboratories are not properly
educated and trained for their particular jobs.133 This presumably increases the
likelihood that mistakes will occur.
Finally, there is the problem of fraud in laboratories. A recent example of this
occurred at a Massachusetts laboratory and involved the laboratory analyst Annie
Dookhan.134 Dookhan admitted that, as a laboratory analyst, she often identified drugs
simply by looking at them rather than by properly testing them.135 She also sometimes
turned negative samples into positive samples by adding narcotics to the samples
herself.136 Dookhan was arrested for these crimes, pled guilty, and is now serving three
to five years in prison.137 However, what happened in Massachusetts was not a single,
isolated occurrence. A number of other crime lab scandals have occurred in states such
as New York, Minnesota, West Virginia, and North Carolina.138
All of these problems seem to indicate that there is good reason for scientific
evidence to be subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. However,
there are also some distinctions between scientific evidence and lay witness
statements that may require scientific evidence to be treated differently.

128. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Tr.
in State v. Kocak, No. SCD110465 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995), available at
http://www.scientific.org/distribution/archive/JohnIvanKocak.pdf).
129. Id. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Metzger, supra note 122, at 494.
134. The Moment Boston State Chemist Is Arrested for Faking Criminal Drug Test Results
Casting Doubt on 34,000 Convictions, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 28, 2012, 17:03 EST),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2210168/Boston-state-chemist-Annie-Dookhan-arrested
-fake-drug-tests-Massachusetts.html [hereinafter Boston State Chemist Arrested].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Milton J. Valencia & John R. Ellement, Annie Dookhan Pleads Guilty in Drug Lab
Scandal, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/11
/22/annie-dookhan-former-state-chemist-who-mishandled-drug-evidence-agrees-plead-guilty
/7UU3hfZUof4DFJGoNUfXGO/story.html.
138. Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect,
and Fraudulent Results, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 4:20 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com
/magazine/article/crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_string_of_shoddy_suspect_and
_fraudu/.

452

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:441

B. Why Experts Are Different from Lay Witnesses
There are two primary reasons why statements made or implied by experts in
their reports should be treated differently than statements made by lay witnesses.
The first reason deals, again, with reliability. As the dissenters noted in
Bullcoming and Justice Breyer noted in Williams, there are already a number of
procedures in place that serve to promote the reliability of scientific reports.139
Accredited DNA labs, for example, must adhere to standards with respect to the
education, training, and experience required of lab workers, as well as testing
procedures, equipment maintenance, audits, and many other things.140
As the previous section illustrated, the availability of these procedures does not
always guarantee the reliability of scientific evidence; however, under certain
circumstances, science can be made reliable. In Williams, for example, the
scientists who were building a DNA profile from semen found on a vaginal swab
taken from the victim had no access to the DNA of any suspect.141 It would have
been impossible for them to intentionally construct the profile in a way that would
incriminate a particular suspect, and it would have been nearly impossible for them
to build the defendant’s exact profile by mistake.142 Although Williams involved
DNA testing, it is possible that through the use of some type of blind procedure, this
same “veil of ignorance” can be created with respect to other kinds of testing.143
The primary purpose test, which the Court has applied since Davis, excludes
statements made in some situations in which lay witnesses are less likely to be able
to fabricate statements;144 however, it does not take into account situations in which
scientists are unable to fabricate evidence. This is one reason why perhaps a
different test should be used with respect to scientific evidence.
The second reason why scientific evidence should be treated differently than
statements made by lay witnesses is a practical reason. The dissenters in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, as well as Justice Breyer in Williams, argued that it
is impractical to apply the Confrontation Clause to expert witnesses and their
reports because, often, a number of experts are involved in the production of any
single report.145 It would be impossible for them to all testify in every case for

139. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249–50 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Jennifer
Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 148.
140. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2249–50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 2243–44 (plurality opinion).
142. Id.
143. Justice Breyer discusses the idea of a “veil of ignorance” keeping scientists from
knowing which defendant their work may incriminate. Id. at 2249 (Breyer, J., concurring).
However, presumably, blind procedures may also keep scientists from having any
pro-prosecution bias, if the scientists are unaware, as they were in Williams, which result of
their testing will benefit the prosecution.
144. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011) (finding that statements made
for the primary purpose of resolving an emergency need not be subject to cross-examination
because the prospect of fabrication is diminished).
145. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring) (twelve or more technicians
could be involved in the production of a DNA report); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
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which they help to prepare a report.146 Moreover, if only one expert must testify, it
is unclear who may testify to the contents of the report and who may not.147
For example, during the testing process at issue in Bullcoming, one laboratory
worker had to receive the sample that was to be tested, record its receipt, and
properly store it.148 Another worker had to take the sample, put it into the testing
machine, and transcribe the results from a printout of the machine onto a report.149
A third worker had to review the results.150 There may have been others who were
important to the process as well, such as the person who calibrated the machine that
was used.151 And in other testing situations, as many as forty people are involved in
the testing process.152
The Court held in Bullcoming that the analyst who transcribed the results from the
machine printout had to testify because implicit in the report was the analyst’s
certification that he had received the sample intact, ensured that the sample number
was the same as the report number, and placed the sample into the machine according
to protocol.153 However, following this reasoning, it seems that it is also implicit in
the report that the first worker, for example, certified that he or she received the
sample intact, properly labeled it, and properly stored it in the correct location.154 It is
not clear why one of the workers must testify and the other one need not.155
Furthermore, as scholars have pointed out, it is beneficial for laboratories to
operate like this, with a number of workers being involved in each test, because
such a procedure can increase accuracy.156 Thus, any rule that would discourage
this kind of testing process is undesirable. For example, in Commonwealth v. Yohe,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to determine whether there was a
Confrontation Clause violation when a reviewer who had not participated in or
observed any part of the blood-alcohol analysis of the defendant’s blood testified
regarding the report prepared by his lab.157 The procedure employed by that
particular lab, however, involved two analysts running separate analyses of the
same blood sample, in order to increase accuracy, and then a reviewer putting the
results of the two tests together and testifying regarding them.158 If courts were to
require that both analysts testify in a situation such as this one, rather than allowing

Ct. 2705, 2724 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 332 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at
332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2714 (majority opinion).
154. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing how
each worker in a testing process is making certifications about what they did and all of those
certifications contribute to the final report).
155. See id.
156. Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 154.
157. 79 A.3d 520, 524–25 (Pa. 2013).
158. Id. at 524.
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a single reviewer of both tests to testify, this would discourage the use of the
procedure, which was designed to promote accuracy.
C. Current Approaches and Previously Suggested Solutions
A number of solutions to the problem of who must testify to the contents of a
scientific report have been proposed by scholars or used by courts. These
approaches can be divided into roughly two categories: (1) approaches that
consider the reliability of the scientific evidence and seek to exempt such reliable
evidence altogether from Confrontation Clause requirements; and (2) approaches
that ignore the reliability of the evidence at issue altogether and attempt to find
other ways to limit who must testify alongside an expert report.
There are a few approaches that fall into the former category. The Melendez-Diaz
dissenters, for example, argued that scientific evidence need not be subject to the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause at all.159 On the other hand, it has been
argued that scientific evidence should not be subject to the Confrontation Clause, but
that reports should be required to provide far more detailed information and should be
held to the Daubert standard with regards to admissibility.160 Finally, Justice Breyer
suggested in Williams that reports prepared by accredited labs, or at least accredited
DNA labs, should be considered presumptively exempt from the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.161 If, however, there is evidence that the laboratory that
prepared the report is incompetent, that its accreditation is invalid, or that it had
motive to falsify the evidence, then the Confrontation Clause would be applicable.162
In the latter category, a number of approaches have been suggested. In
Bullcoming, for example, Justice Sotomayor noted some ways in which someone
other than the “analyst” (or no one at all) might be able to testify to the contents of
a report.163 For example, she suggested that a machine printout alone could be
introduced into evidence without testimony or a report.164 She also wrote that a
supervisor with minimal involvement in the testing process may be able to testify to
the contents of the report itself.165 The Williams plurality added two additional
scenarios. First, a scientist can testify to the contents of a report prepared by others
if the contents of the report are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but only to explain an independent opinion made by the testifying

159. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160. Eric Nielson, Note, The Admission of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Crawford World,
14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 951, 952–53, 974–76 (2013). See generally Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing the standard for admitting
expert testimony in federal courts).
161. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251–52 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 2252.
163. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also Nicholas Klaiber, Note, Confronting Reality: Surrogate Forensic
Science Witnesses Under the Confrontation Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 199, 203–04 (2011)
(arguing that supervisors who were minimally connected to the testing process should be
able to testify regarding the report).
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scientist.166 Second, anyone can introduce the contents of a report into evidence if
the report was not prepared with the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual of a crime.167
Finally, scholars have come up with a number of solutions that also fall under
this second category. One proposal is that the testimony of one scientist who was
substantially involved in the testing process should be sufficient to introduce the
entire report.168 This is similar to one of Justice Sotomayor’s suggestions in
Bullcoming.169 Other suggestions allow the introduction of a report through a
substitute witness when the “analyst” is unavailable and certain other criteria are
met.170 Mnookin and Kaye, for example, propose that an expert should be allowed
to testify to the contents of another expert’s report when the original analyst is
unavailable, retesting is impossible, and the report is sufficiently detailed to allow
another expert to exercise independent judgment.171 Justice Breyer lists some other
proposals that have been made in his concurring opinion in Williams; for the most
part, however, they are largely similar to those already described.172
Unfortunately, as will be explained in Part III, none of these solutions
adequately addresses the problem.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL
This Note proposes a new solution, drawing largely on facts that the plurality
found relevant in Williams. Although the two alternative approaches that the
plurality explicitly adhered to in Williams are unworkable, the plurality noted a
number of factors throughout its opinion that helped to justify its overall
conclusion. First, the plurality noted that the chances of fraud or mistake during the
DNA profile building process were low, given the circumstances.173 Second, there
was information provided to the testifying expert that was sufficient for an
uninvolved expert to draw an independent conclusion (i.e., errors could be detected
by looking at the DNA profile itself and a match could be found by comparing it
with another profile).174 Finally, an expert who was qualified to examine the DNA

166. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 2242–43.
168. See, e.g., Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the
Horns: How the Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming v. New Mexico to Clarify
Confrontation Clause Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502, 537 (2011).
169. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 156; Jesse J. Norris, Who Can Testify
About Lab Results After Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming?: Surrogate Testimony and the
Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 425–27 (2011) (discussing a few approaches
to this problem that require unavailability of the original analyst). Norris also proposes a
different approach: allowing surrogate testimony only when the report is non-testimonial.
Norris, supra, at 376. However, since non-testimonial evidence is not subject to the
Confrontation Clause currently, this Note will not address that approach.
171. Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 156.
172. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 2243–44 (plurality opinion).
174. See id. at 2229–31, 2244.
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profiles, explain the DNA profiling methodology, and make the DNA match did
testify regarding the match.175
This Note proposes that these factors can be used to formulate a new test. That is,
an expert who was not involved in the actual testing process should be able to testify
regarding a report if (1) there is evidence that suggests that the underlying analysis
was sufficiently reliable; (2) the report is sufficiently detailed; and (3) the testifying
expert has knowledge sufficient to make him or her an adequate substitute witness.
This Note will explain and justify each of these requirements in turn.
A. Reliability of the Underlying Analysis
The Supreme Court has stated that ensuring the reliability of evidence is the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause,176 and despite the overturning of Ohio v.
Roberts, the Court has also stated that when evidence is exempt from the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause, that exemption is justified by the relative
reliability of the evidence.177 Thus, if some kind of exception is to be made for
scientific evidence, the reliability of the evidence should be a consideration.
Yet, a number of the solutions to the problem of experts and confrontation that
the Court and scholars have offered do not take reliability into account at all, and
some of them even decrease reliability. For example, the plurality’s proposed
alteration of the primary purpose test in Williams focuses on whether there is a
suspect under investigation and whether the scientists who prepare a report are
aware of that suspect.178 This makes some sense in the context of that case, since it
is difficult to fabricate DNA evidence without a suspect’s DNA.179 However, in
other circumstances, whether or not there is a suspect has little to do with the
prospect of fabrication or the risk of a mistake.180 For example, in a drug case like
Melendez-Diaz, if the police had found the drugs in a car and had them tested before
connecting the car with a suspect, the scientists doing the testing would have no less
reason to fabricate evidence than they would if the suspect was known. Their motive
to fabricate comes from their knowledge that the police believe what they are testing
to be drugs and their desire to assist the police by making such a finding.181
The other Williams solution, allowing experts to testify to the results of another
expert’s analysis if not offering those results for the truth of the matter asserted, is

175. See id. at 2229–30. The plurality did not explicitly focus on the qualifications of the
testifying witness; however, it stressed that the testifying witness was testifying to an
independent opinion. See id. at 2233. Implicit in that is that the testifying witness was
sufficiently qualified to be able to render such an opinion.
176. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
177. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011) (finding that statements made
for the primary purpose of resolving an emergency need not be subject to cross-examination
because the prospect of fabrication is diminished).
178. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44 (plurality opinion).
179. See id.
180. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round
Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 59 (2012) (criticizing the “targeted individual” test).
181. See Metzger, supra note 122, at 496–98 (describing the problem of pro-prosecution
bias in crime labs).
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no better at ensuring the reliability of the evidence presented. As scholars have
noted, there is really no reason for the evidence to be offered at all if not for its
truth.182 And when following this approach to determine whether evidence is
admissible, the less the witness who is testifying says about the reliability of the
evidence, the more likely the evidence is to be admissible.183 Calling a witness who
may be able to testify somewhat about the accuracy of the underlying analysis is
discouraged; it is better to ignore the accuracy of the underlying analysis
completely, if one wants to admit the evidence, because attempting to prove that
the underlying analysis is accurate demonstrates that the evidence is being offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.184
Proposed solutions allowing for the introduction of a report through a surrogate
witness when the original analyst is unavailable also do nothing to ensure the
reliability of the report.185 And allowing a single lab worker who was significantly
involved in part of the testing process to testify does nothing to ensure the reliability
of the parts of the testing that were conducted by other workers without that worker
present. None of these solutions, thus, adequately takes reliability into account when
it exempts a number of workers who contributed to a report from testifying.
Reliability should be a factor that is explicitly considered by courts when
determining whether to admit a laboratory’s report. However, only a particular kind
of reliability should be considered. This Note previously discussed four types of
error that occur in the production of laboratory reports.186 Two of these types of
error, errors related to the interpretation of results and errors related to the
methodology employed, are not relevant here. Any qualified expert in a particular
field should be able to testify as to how the results of the testing should be
interpreted and whether the methodology employed is a valid methodology. The
problematic types of error are the two types of error that might be made by any of
the number of workers involved in the testing process and that might be known
only by the person who committed the error: mistakes and fraudulent activity.
Courts should, therefore, look for evidence that the risks of mistakes in the testing
process and of fraudulent reporting of results are low before deciding to admit a
report through an uninvolved witness. The prosecution should be required to offer

182. Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 101 (“On the particular facts of Williams, we
maintain that notwithstanding several Justices’ argument to the contrary, there were no
plausible grounds for deeming the evidence introduced for a purpose other than its truth.”).
183. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2235 (plurality opinion) (noting that the testifying expert
“did not vouch for the quality of Cellmark’s work”).
184. Justice Kagan criticizes this aspect of the opinion in her dissent. Id. at 2268 (Kagan,
J., dissenting). She notes that the defense attorney had even less opportunity to
cross-examine a witness regarding the underlying analysis than in Bullcoming because the
testifying witness in Williams knew even less about that underlying testing than the
testifying witness in Bullcoming did. Id.
185. At least one scholar has suggested that a report be allowed to be introduced when
the analyst is unavailable and the evidence is trustworthy. Norris, supra note 170, at 427
(reviewing several proposed solutions). Although this does seem to take reliability into
account, it does not completely address the problem of experts and confrontation since the
problem exists even when the analysts who performed the testing are technically available.
186. See supra Part II.A.
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evidence that the workers involved were competent (for example, their qualifications
and the results of some kind of proficiency testing) and that there were procedures in
place to protect against the prospect of fraud and regularly sloppy work.
In Williams, it was the lack of a suspect that ensured that the risks of fraud and
mistake were low.187 If scientists do not know what a defendant’s DNA profile looks
like, it is nearly impossible to intentionally or accidently create a profile that matches
that profile.188 However, this risk reduction should be able to be replicated in other
types of testing through the use of laboratory procedures. For example, in a drug lab
like the one in Melendez-Diaz, the laboratory could use negative control samples—
that is, samples that are not actually drugs—to make those performing the tests on the
drugs unaware what the result of the tests is expected to be (rather than simply
assuming that the result should be that the substance tested positive for some kind of
controlled substance189). If some of the samples that must be tested are negative, the
test performers do not know which ones those are, and the laboratory checks to
ensure that the test performers correctly identified those samples as negative, that
should serve to both prevent fraud and detect an excessive amount of mistakes.
This type of procedure would likely have prevented the fraudulent activity that
occurred in Massachusetts involving Annie Dookhan. Dookhan had been
identifying substances as drugs without testing them and sometimes adding drugs
into negative samples to make them positive samples.190 If the procedure described
above had been employed, however, the laboratory would have quickly discovered
her. Other procedures, such as random retesting of samples and audits of laboratory
workers’ work, may also be sufficient to prevent this kind of fraud from occurring.191
An objection to this reliability requirement is that it would be in contradiction of
Crawford. In Crawford, the Court held that reliability was no longer a
consideration in determining whether a statement is subject to the Confrontation
Clause’s requirements.192 However, as previously explained, there are two good
reasons for treating forensic laboratory reports differently than statements made by
lay witnesses. First, the Court in Crawford found that “[r]eliability is an
amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept[,]”193 but that is only the case when
attempting to determine the reliability of a statement made by a lay witness. As one
writer pointed out, with respect to science, “reliability is a measurable quantity.”194
Thus, one of the reasons that made the holding in Crawford necessary with respect
to lay witnesses is inapplicable to scientific reports. Second, statements made by

187. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44 (plurality opinion).
188. Id.
189. See Metzger, supra note 122, at 496–98 (explaining that analysts sometimes assume
that the police and prosecution desire a particular test outcome and operate with a bias based
on that assumption).
190. Boston State Chemist Arrested, supra note 134.
191. In the Dookhan case, audits revealed that Dookhan tested around five times as many
samples as any other lab worker, which caused coworkers to express concern about her
work. Id. In addition, a chemist who retested Dookhan’s samples found seven instances in
which she incorrectly identified a substance. Id.
192. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
193. Id. at 63.
194. Nielson, supra note 160, at 969.
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lay witnesses are easily attributable to one person. Because forensic laboratory
reports are often produced by many lab workers, it is impractical to apply Crawford
to these reports in the same way as it is applied to statements made by lay
witnesses.195 If some of the workers must not be required to testify, then it makes
sense to bring reliability back into the picture as a justification for that.
B. A Detailed Report
In addition to the reliability requirement, in order for a substitute expert to testify
to the contents of a forensic science report, the report should have to be sufficiently
detailed. Some other scholars have included the requirement of a more detailed report
in their own proposed solutions. For example, Mnookin and Kaye suggested that
when the original analyst is unavailable, retesting is impossible, and the report is
“sufficiently detailed to permit the surrogate to exercise independent judgment,”
surrogate testimony should be allowed.196 Another writer argued that reports should
have to include information on a number of things: sample identifiers, documentation
of the chain of custody of the sample, the analysts’ names and credentials, evidence
of the analysts’ qualifications to perform the test, the laboratory’s certification, the
testing method used, evidence of the reliability of the method used, the results of the
testing, the calibration log for any machine used, a statement of any relevant
observations made, a statement that everything in the report is true, and evidence of a
second-party review.197 To meet this Note’s proposed requirement, a report should, at
the very least, describe the methodology used and include all of the results of the
testing, including any raw data that was produced by the testing. However, the more
that is included in the report about the process, the better.
A detailed report is crucial for a few reasons. First, it allows a substitute witness
to know the methodology that was followed so that the substitute witness can thus
testify as to his or her own opinion on that methodology’s validity.
Second, it allows a substitute witness to draw his or her own conclusions with
respect to interpretation of the data, rather than simply reading a conclusion that
was arrived at by others. This is what Mnookin and Kaye were concerned with
when they suggested that a report be detailed enough for another expert to draw an
independent conclusion from reading the report.198
Lastly, in some situations, a detailed report may allow an expert reading the
report to detect errors that were made during the testing process. This is what
happened in the Kocak case that was described by the concurrence and dissent in
Williams. In that case, the witness testified that the laboratory had found a match
between the crime scene DNA and the defendant’s DNA.199 However, she later
realized that the sample numbers had been switched at some point on the report; the
match was between the victim’s DNA and the crime scene DNA, not the

195. Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 149, 152.
196. Id. at 156.
197. Nielson, supra note 160, at 975–76.
198. See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 156.
199. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2246 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Tr.
in State v. Kocak, No. SCD110465 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995), available at
http://www.scientific.org/distribution/archive/JohnIvanKocak.pdf).
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defendant’s DNA.200 This mistake was detected not by speaking with those
involved in the testing process, but by reviewing the report.201 Presumably, errors
like this are more likely to be caught the more detailed the report is.
Errors like this are also probably more likely to be caught through the review of
a detailed report than through the cross-examination of an involved analyst.
Analysts, after all, perform a large number of tests every year and are unlikely to
remember any particular test and whether they may have made any mistakes during
it at the time of a trial.202 Thus, even if the analyst testifies, he or she will likely
base his or her testimony solely on the report.203
C. An Adequate Substitute Witness
The last requirement that should have to be met in order for a substitute witness
to testify regarding a forensic laboratory report is the requirement of an adequate
substitute witness. In order to be an adequate substitute, a witness should be
familiar with the methodology that was employed and able to testify regarding its
validity and should also be sufficiently qualified to be able to independently
interpret the results of the testing.204 In a case like Williams, where particular
laboratory procedures are not necessary to ensure the accuracy of the underlying
analysis (because intentionally or mistakenly creating the defendant’s DNA profile
is nearly impossible205), the substitute need not be from the laboratory that
produced the report.206 In situations in which the previously mentioned procedures
are necessary, however, the substitute witness should be a supervisor, director, or
person of a similar position from the laboratory that produced the report.207
Some have argued that no witness should be required to testify in order to
introduce a laboratory report if the report is sufficiently reliable208 or sufficiently
detailed.209 However, considering that departure from Crawford is justified with

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 339 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Nielson, supra note 160, at 968–69.
203. Nielson, supra note 160, at 968–69.
204. This bears some similarity to the requirement included in some tests proposed by
scholars that the substitute witness be able to offer an independent opinion. See, e.g.,
Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 156.
205. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44 (plurality opinion).
206. In Williams, the witness who testified about the DNA match based on the DNA
profile produced by Cellmark was not from Cellmark, and no witness from Cellmark
testified. See id. at 2229–30.
207. Unlike in other proposed solutions, however, the substitute witness does not have to
have had any connection to the particular test at issue. Cf. Klaiber, supra note 165, at 203–
04 (arguing that supervisors who were minimally connected to the testing process should be
able to testify regarding the report).
208. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251–52 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that reports
from accredited labs should be presumptively exempt from the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause).
209. See Nielson, supra note 160, at 952–53, 974–76 (arguing that reports should be
required to meet Daubert and be sufficiently detailed, but should not be subject to
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respect to scientific reports largely because of the impracticality of having everyone
who contributed to a report testify,210 there is little justification for requiring no one
at all to testify. Requiring one scientist to testify strikes the appropriate balance
between practicality and the confrontation requirement of Crawford.
In addition, there are two major benefits to requiring one adequate substitute
witness to testify. First, the substitute witness can testify generally regarding the
methodology employed and can testify as to his or her own interpretation of the
results of the testing.211 Thus, the witness can be cross-examined on the validity of
the methodology and on the validity of the witness’s interpretation of the results.
Second, if the witness is a supervisor or director from the laboratory that
produced the report, the witness can testify about the laboratory’s policies and
procedures generally, the competence of the workers who produced the report, the
results of any proficiency testing they underwent, and the results of their testing of
the negative control samples previously described212 or of the retesting of their
samples.213 Laboratory personnel should generally have some idea of whether their
lab follows procedures or whether it does not. They also have some knowledge of
the reputations of other lab workers. In the case of Annie Dookhan, for example,
co-workers of Dookhan had been suspicious of her work.214 They noticed that she
was more productive than everyone else, that she never used a microscope, and that
she weighed samples without doing a balance check on the scale.215 All of this
knowledge is information that could be delved into during cross-examination.
Some might object to the allowance of such a substitute witness’s testimony on
the grounds that it is in contradiction of Bullcoming.216 In Bullcoming, the Court
found that such surrogate witness testimony is a violation of the Confrontation
Clause.217 However, Bullcoming should be reconsidered because in the context of
forensic expert testimony, surrogate witness testimony is inevitable. For example,
Confrontation Clause requirements).
210. See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 149, 152 (discussing the problem of
scientific reports being created by a number of people).
211. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229–30 (plurality opinion) (testifying witness explained
DNA profiling methodology and explained her own conclusion regarding the DNA match).
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. Cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 334 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“The director is arguably the most effective person to confront for revealing any
ambiguity in findings, variations in procedures, or problems in the office, as he or she is
most familiar with the standard procedures, the office’s variations, and problems in prior
cases or with particular analysts.”). This is more than the testifying analyst could testify to in
Bullcoming, since, although he knew the laboratory’s policies and procedures, he was not a
supervisor or director and knew nothing of the testing analyst’s competence or other related
things. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011) (describing how the
New Mexico Supreme Court found the testifying analyst’s testimony to be sufficient because
the testifying analyst knew the testing method and the laboratory’s procedures, but then
finding that testimony insufficient because the testifying analyst did not know, for example,
whether the testing analyst was placed on leave due to incompetence).
214. Boston State Chemist Arrested, supra note 134.
215. Id.
216. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (holding that the testimony of a scientist who did
not perform or observe the test was not sufficient to introduce the report).
217. Id.
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even if an analyst who participated in the testing process testifies, that analyst is
arguably serving as a surrogate for all of the other laboratory workers who were
involved in the testing process but who are not testifying. Because it is impractical
to have all of the workers testify,218 some kind surrogate testimony is necessary.
The Court seems to have recognized this to some extent. In Bullcoming, Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged that there should be circumstances in which something
similar to surrogate testimony is permitted.219 Moreover, in Williams, the plurality
arguably allowed surrogate testimony, in contradiction of Bullcoming.220
This Note suggests that surrogate testimony should be permitted, but only in
circumstances in which it is reliable. Bullcoming was problematic because in that
case there were questions regarding the test-performing analyst’s competence.221
Those questions would not exist, however, if the prosecution had been required to
prove the analyst’s competence before admission of testimony regarding the report.
Furthermore, in Bullcoming, the testifying analyst could not testify regarding the
test-performing analyst’s competence at all.222 If an adequate substitute witness
who could testify regarding such matters had testified, the defendant would have
had more of an opportunity to expose potential problems via cross-examination.
For these reasons, to the extent that the requirements of Bullcoming contradict
this Note’s proposal, they should be overruled. As noted, however, Williams has
arguably already taken a step in that direction.223
CONCLUSION
Although the Court was right in Williams to place limitations on a defendant’s
right to confront forensic experts, it failed to provide a clear standard for courts to
follow in the future. The Court seemed to consider a number of factors (although it
did not do so explicitly) in that case, and those factors may provide guidance as to
what kinds of factors should be considered as part of a future test. Sooner or later,
however, the Court will have to directly answer the crucial question: who must testify
in order for a laboratory report to be introduced into evidence against the accused?
This Note has proposed an answer to that question: a substitute witness who was
not directly involved in the testing should be able to testify to the contents of a
laboratory report if (1) the underlying analysis is reliable; (2) the report is
sufficiently detailed; and (3) the testifying witness is an adequate substitute. This
solution attempts to address the reliability concerns associated with forensic
evidence while also taking into account the practical limitations of laboratories and

218. Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 139, at 149, 152.
219. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
220. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2267–68 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
221. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–16 (noting that there was no evidence that the
test-performing analyst had not been placed on unpaid leave due to his incompetence).
222. See id. at 2715.
223. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2267–68 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Williams
contradicts Bullcoming); Hon. G. Ross Anderson Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause
Sanity: The Supreme Court (Finally) Retreats from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, FED.
LAW., Mar. 2013, at 67, 68 (arguing that Williams was a retreat from Bullcoming and a step
in the right direction).
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their staff. Following the standard would ensure that defendants can contest the
reliability of the evidence offered against them as much as possible, that other
safeguards will also help to promote the reliability of that evidence, and that
laboratories are not unduly burdened by a requirement that every lab worker must
testify in every case in which they play any role. Perhaps most importantly, this
solution would provide a clear standard that would reduce the confusion that is
currently present in the lower courts and promote consistency throughout our
justice system.

